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Abstract 
A test or an examination in an educational setting may be considered as a situation in which 
individuals face a series of decisions under risk. The experiment conducted in this study 
replicates an actual test situation in which students approach a multiple choice test having 
accumulated known scores from previous assessments, each contributing towards an aggregate. 
It permits the analysis of the framing effect on a student’s degree of risk aversion, based on 
their tendency to guess, under the adoption of a negative marking regime. This enables an 
evaluation of whether or not the behaviour of students, influenced by the framing effect of a 
scoring rule as a potential gain or loss relative to a reference point, is consistent with the 
behaviour initiated by prospect theory. Furthermore, this study investigates whether a deviation 
of points further into the gain and loss domain yields increasingly or decreasingly risk averse 
behaviour. In general, the findings reveal that individuals exhibit a higher degree of risk 
aversion in the gain domain in comparison to the loss domain. In addition, individuals tend to 
become less risk averse/more risk seeking as a deviation of points away from the reference in 
the loss domain such that the lowest degree of risk aversion is displayed at the extreme end of 
the loss domain. Similarly, for a deviation of points further away from the reference in the gain 
domain, individuals in financial need i.e. those who are recipients of a lower monthly income 
tend to become increasingly risk averse, while those who are recipients of a higher monthly 
income tend to become decreasingly risk averse.  
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1 Introduction 
There are many situations in which individuals are required to make a series of decisions in the 
presence of risk. A typical situation is that of a student during a multiple choice examination, 
under a negative marking regime. This negative marking regime, architected to discourage 
guessing, presents students who are not able to certainly identify the correct answer to a 
question with a gamble. Either the problematic question is omitted, ensuring that no points are 
gained or lost, or it is answered, manifesting the possibility of scoring points for a correct 
response, but inviting the risk of being penalised for an incorrect one. Hence, the performance 
on such a test is dependent upon whether or not the student chooses to answer a question when 
confronted with such a gamble. Expected utility theory has been a preponderant approach in 
the analysis of decision making under risk, in which explicit information pertaining to the 
potential consequences of choices made by economic agents and their associated probabilities 
are known. In addition, the expected utility approach has been viewed as a descriptive model 
of rational choice; however, the rationality of an individual is limited by the cognitive 
limitations of their minds, the information that they are presented with, and the time period that 
they have in order to make a decision.  
The behavioural characteristics that influence risk taking by individuals may also have an effect 
on the decisions made by students during a test or an examination. Ordinarily, a rational 
examinee is defined as a student whose aim is to maximise his/her expected score; however, 
extensive literature on behavioural decision making advocates that individuals may behave in 
a non-rational manner, condemning the rational prescriptions of expected utility theory. The 
framing effect1 (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) of scoring rules as a potential gain or loss relative 
to a reference point has been proposed as a possible explanation of why students do not 
maximise their expected score and can be elucidated using prospect theory. Prospect theory - 
developed by Kahneman & Tversky (1979), is based on the premise that individuals are not 
always rational in their decision making. The authors postulate that individuals are risk averse 
when their outcomes are perceived as gains and risk seeking when perceived as losses.  
In a decision making experiment conducted by Bereby-Meyer et al. (2002), participants – who 
were first-year, Israeli, undergraduate, social science students, were presented with a 
                                                          
1  The “framing effect” is an example of a cognitive bias which occurs when the description of a set of options in 
terms of gains and losses elicits systematically different choices which affects a decision maker’s risk tolerance. 
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hypothetical multiple choice test situation under different scoring rules and were asked to 
indicate the degree of certainty, ranging from 0 to 100, that they judged was necessary in order 
to answer each question presented to them. A gain and loss domain had been created as some 
participants were told to anticipate a grade above the passing grade required for the course, 
while others were told to anticipate a grade below the passing grade which was therefore 
assumed to be the reference point (Bereby-Meyer, Meyer, & Flascher, 2002). The authors 
conducted a further experiment which resembled an actual test situation aimed at replicating 
the results from the prior synthetic experiments of their study in a more realistic setting. Since 
this experiment was conducted as part of a course requirement, participants were told that they 
would receive half an hour of experimental credit in which they will be given an additional half 
an hour to complete any future tests for the course under consideration, if their final score 
reached a value above 75 points, thus serving as the new reference point. In this instance, a 
gain and loss frame had been created as one group was told that the average score obtained by 
students who had previously taken the test was above the 75 point reference, whereas the 
second group was told that the average score of these examinees was below the 75 point 
reference. 
The experiment in this study is designed to analyse the effects of framing in a multiple choice 
test setting on the tendency to guess under a negative marking rule by replicating an actual test 
situation in which students enter a test or examination with a certain aggregate based upon their 
previous test scores or examination results. In addition, this study aims to assess whether the 
behaviour of students under such circumstances is consistent with the behaviour predicted by 
prospect theory. According to prospect theory, students should be risk averse in the domain of 
gains, rendering them reluctant to guess; and risk seeking in the domain of losses, encouraging 
more guessing. It therefore finds itself embedded in the realm of behavioural economic 
literature. As a departure from the experiment conducted by Bereby-Meyer et al. (2002), a gain 
and loss domain which reflects the average test scores of students from previous tests or 
examinations is replicated by assigning differential points randomly to different groups before 
they commence with the experimental test. Participants gain and lose points according to the 
negative marking rule adopted in this study2 in addition to the points that they enter the test 
with. The payoff to the participants are in monetary terms on a Rand (R1) per point basis. As 
such, the students were supplied with an incentive to participate in the experiment. Participating 
                                                          
2  A detailed description of the negative marking rule adopted in this study will be discussed in Section 3. 
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students were promised a bonus of 50 Rand (R50) if they attained a score above 50 points after 
completion of the test. Thus, a score of 50 points serves as a reference which is reflective of a 
pass mark for most courses in a realistic test setting.  
A further contribution of this study is investigating whether the distance into the gain and loss 
domain as a deviation of marks further away from the reference point yields significantly 
different results. This, to our knowledge, has previously not been investigated in any empirical 
literature pertaining to prospect theory. In particular, the experiment seeks to investigate 
whether individuals are increasingly or decreasingly risk averse in the gain domain; and 
similarly, whether individuals are increasingly or decreasingly risk seeking in the loss domain. 
For a greater deviation of points in the gain domain, students may either exhibit increased risk 
aversion as they prefer to remain with certainty at a particular score and are thus reluctant to 
guess and lose the points which they have accumulated; or they may exhibit decreasingly risk 
averse behaviour in which their willingness to guess increases since they have more points to 
take a gamble with. Similarly, for a greater deviation in the loss domain, students may display 
an increase in their willingness to guess as it is beneficial for them to take a gamble and 
potentially receive a higher score from each correct guess; or they may display decreasingly 
risk seeking behaviour as they are reluctant to lose the few points that they have accumulated.  
The remainder of this study will proceed as follows: Section 2 reviews literature pertaining to 
scoring rules and the framing effect, and provides a brief description of prospect theory. A 
description of the experiment conducted in this study is presented in Section 3 with an analysis 
of the data and a discussion of the corresponding results is presented in Section 4. Section 5 
provides a description of the regression methodology and the accompanying results, and 
Section 6 concludes this paper.  
2 Literature Review 
The use and grading of multiple choice questions is a well-established and reliable method of 
assessing knowledge in standardised tests and examinations within the education space. These 
multiple choice tests are advantageous to both the instructor and the student. From an 
instructor’s perspective, these tests offer increased accuracy and reliability in scoring (Walstad 
& Becker, 1994) as well as objectivity of the grading process (Becker & Johnston, 1999). In 
addition, Buckles & Siegfried (2006) reveal that these tests enable instructors to cover a wide 
range of subject material, and facilitate the availability of comparative statistical analysis.  
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From a student’s perspective, the objectivity of the grading process is welcomed, since it 
ensures consistent scoring, and eliminates instructor bias (Kniveton, 1996). Furthermore, 
students can increase the probability of guessing the correct answer to a question by eliminating 
the unlikely choices (Bush, 2001), especially under scoring rules in which these random 
guesses are not subject to a penalty. 
The basic scoring rule adopted by many examiners is the Number of Right (NR) rule in which 
the test score is the number of correct answers multiplied by some constant, and there is no 
penalty for an incorrect response. For a student who wishes to maximise his/her score on a test, 
answering every question, even though some answers will have to be chosen at random, will 
be his optimal strategy (Lord, 1975).  A drawback of this rule is the deleterious effect of the 
guessing of responses on the reliability of a test. Given that there is some probability that a 
guessed response will be correct, an examinee may gain points for questions in which they 
have no knowledge of the correct solution. In the presence of different response strategies 
between two students with the same level of knowledge, in which one student displays a 
tendency towards guessing, and the other does not - the examinee who chooses to guess 
subsequently receives a higher observed score for the test. Thus, the guessing strategy adds 
random error to the variance of test scores which undermines the reliability of the assessment 
(Bereby-Meyer, Meyer, & Flascher, 2002).  
Formula scoring rules, also known as negative marking, are frequently adopted as a means to 
discourage guessing by subtracting points for incorrect responses; and unanswered questions 
are neither penalised nor rewarded (Holt, 2006). The penalty for an incorrect response serves 
to augment the reliability of tests through a reduction in the measurement errors induced by 
guessing. A formula scoring rule of this nature will be adopted in this study. A basic property 
of such formula scoring rules is that the expected value of a pure guess is the same as the 
expected value from omitting a response (Budescu & Bar-Hillel, 1993). However, Davis (1967) 
asserts that a limitation of the formula scoring rule is the failure to take into account the partial 
knowledge of examinees, which enables them to eliminate one or more solution options.  As 
students with partial knowledge eliminate one or more solution options, the expected value of 
guessing exceeds the expected value of omitting a response which therefore results in guessing 
as being the optimal strategy. The findings of Bliss (1980) reveals that risk averse students are 
more likely to omit questions for which they only have partial knowledge. Regardless of the 
positive expected payoff, these examinees underestimate their partial knowledge and are at a 
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disadvantage compared to other students. This approach fails to maximise the expected score, 
and the bias against risk averse students under a negative marking regime may vary 
systematically, depending on the demographic characteristics of the student (Hartford & 
Spearman, 2014).  
Behavioural literature pertaining to gender differences and risk attitudes advocates that females 
exhibit a greater degree of risk aversion in comparison to their male counterparts. Within a 
multiple choice test framework among economics students in Spain in which students were 
penalised for incorrect responses, Marin and Rosa-Garcia (2011) report evidence of a higher 
degree of risk aversion for female students, measured by the number of unanswered questions. 
Consequently, the test scores of more risk averse students are lower since they behave in a non-
rational manner; however, the differences among test scores between less risk averse students 
and more risk averse students are marginal. The Economics Department at the University of 
the Witwatersrand implemented a decision in 2013 to discontinue negative marking in multiple 
choice test questions for the first year economics course. Hartford and Spearman (2014) viewed 
this decision as an opportunity to conduct a natural experiment with the aim of investigating 
the gender bias effect under a negative marking regime. The assessment results were obtained 
in an actual test setting and were therefore free from any framing biases associated with 
controlled experiments. The authors’ findings provide evidence of a gender bias against female 
students when a negative marking rule is adopted. In addition, female students in higher 
performance quantiles exhibit greater risk aversion and omit a larger number of questions than 
those in lower performance quantiles, and are thus adversely affected by negative marking 
(Hartford & Spearman, 2014).   
According to Bereby-Meyer et al. (2002), the framing of scoring rules serves as a possible 
explanation of why students do not maximise their expected score. In particular, when 
individuals’ choices are framed positively in terms of gains and negatively in terms of losses 
in the face of equivalent descriptions of a decision problem, this results in contradictory choices 
among them. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) suggest that the frame adopted by a decision 
maker is dependent partly upon the way in which the problems are presented, and partly upon 
the norms, habits and personal characteristics of the decision maker. According to decision 
theory, the framing effect may be defined in both a “strict” sense and a “loose” sense. Tversky 
and Kahneman (1981) are proponents of this definition in a strict sense which is related to the 
manipulation of the wording of identical problems. A classic example proposed by the authors 
is the “Asian Disease Problem” which reveals that decision makers tend to be risk averse when 
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an outcome is viewed as a gain and risk seeking when an outcome is viewed as a loss. 
Kuhberger (1998) is an advocate of framing in the loose sense in which a situation is referred 
to as an internal event induced by other contextual features aside from semantic manipulation; 
as well as individual factors. An example of the framing effect in a loose sense is provided by 
Aquino, Steisel & Kay (1992) in which differential responses to social dilemmas that result in 
a collective disaster as a consequence of individually reasonable decisions, are presented as 
give-some versus take-some dilemmas.  
Bereby-Meyer et al. (2002) base their analysis of test-taking on prospect theory which is the 
most well-known formal theory, providing a descriptive model of choice under risk developed 
by Kahneman & Tversky (1979). 
 For simplicity, Kahneman & Tversky (1979) restrict the formal treatment to simple gambles 
or lotteries involving stated numerical probabilities and quantitative outcomes. Consider a 
simple prospect (𝑥, 𝑝; 𝑦, 𝑞) that yields an outcome 𝑥 with probability 𝑝, an outcome 𝑦 with 
probability 𝑞, and preserves the status quo, which is usually an individual’s reference point, 
with probability (1 − 𝑝 − 𝑞). According to prospect theory, a decision weight 𝜋(𝑝) reflects 
the impact of 𝑝 on the overall value of a prospect, and a value 𝑣 assigned to each outcome, 
such that 𝑣(. ) reflects the subjective value of a particular outcome. The overall value of a 
prospect is therefore given by 𝜋(𝑝)𝑣(𝑥) +  𝜋(𝑞)𝑣(𝑦) where 𝑣(0) = 0, 𝜋(0) = 0 and 𝜋(1) =
1. In addition, Kahneman &Tversky (1981) propose an S-shaped valuation function defined on 
deviations from a reference point of which a hypothetical illustration is depicted in Figure 1 
                 Figure 1: A Hypothetical Value Function 
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above. The decision weight function 𝜋(𝑝) is monotonic in 𝑝 and tends to overweight highly 
unlikely outcomes or low probabilities, and underweight moderate to high probabilities as a 
result of the limited ability of individuals to comprehend and evaluate extreme probabilities.  
The aforementioned features result in preferences that depend on the way in which problems 
are framed. Bereby-Meyer et al. (2002) suggest that the framing effect has implications for the 
guessing of solutions in a multiple choice test. In the loose sense of the term, framing in such 
a situation denotes the way in which students perceive themselves as a function of their 
individual factors.  These factors include the current situation that they are faced with, their 
abilities, previous achievements and aspirations.  Prospect theory predicts a concave and 
shallow value function for students who perceive themselves to be in the gain domain. A 
student may choose to omit an answer and remain with certainty at some position, or engage 
in a gamble and choose to guess, in which both a gain and a loss are possible outcomes. The 
shape of the valuation function in the gain domain implies that the value associated with 
expected gains is of lower magnitude than the value associated with an equally sized expected 
loss, thus omitting an answer seems more attractive than guessing, and students tend to be risk 
averse (Bereby-Meyer, Meyer, & Flascher, 2002). In contrast, prospect theory predicts a 
convex and relatively steep value function for students in the loss domain. The shape of the 
valuation function implies that the value associated with the expected gain is larger in 
magnitude than the value associated with the expected loss, thus guessing an answer is more 
attractive than omission, and students tend to be risk seeking in the loss domain. 
Krawczyk (2011) makes use of a field experiment to manipulate the framing of simple 
decisions under risk. The framing of a microeconomics test question as an opportunity for 
either a gain or a loss is examined when a missing response is scored higher than an incorrect 
one, and the impact of a test-takers’ likelihood to answer the question is evaluated. A gain and 
loss treatment is created, in which each treatment group receives different exam instructions 
regarding the number of points per item. Within the gain treatment, a student can never lose a 
point, whereas in the loss treatment, a student can never gain a point.   Whether a solution to a 
question is correct, incorrect or omitted, a student in the gain treatment is awarded 3 points 
more as a baseline than a student in the loss treatment. Under this regime, in an examination 
comprising of 30 multiple choice questions, any solution combination would automatically 
yield 90 points more within the gain domain in comparison to the loss domain. The results 
reveal that the framing effect has no impact on the likelihood of answering a question. The 
experimental subjects were generally risk averse in both the gain and loss domain, and this 
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deviation from the pattern predicted by Kahneman & Tversky (1979) may be attributed to the 
underlying reward medium involving academic success instead of a monetary payoff 
(Krawczyk, 2011) such as the one which will be used in this study.  
3 Experiment 
A sample of 102 undergraduate Economics students from the University of the Witwatersrand 
voluntarily enrolled to participate in the experiment. Participating students were randomly 
allocated to four different treatment groups; however, an attempt was made in order to stratify 
allocation by gender to ensure that there were a sufficient number of male and female students 
within each treatment group. This stratification permitted the analysis of possible treatment 
heterogeneities along gender lines.  
The decision making experiment was conducted in a classroom setting. A multiple choice test 
(see supplementary appendix) consisting of 10 questions was presented to the students, and 
each question was comprised of 3 possible solution options, of which the student was made to 
choose 1. The test consisted of a number of questions that could not be answered, whereby 
none of the alternative solutions provided were correct, and a response to such a question was 
indicative of a pure guess (Slakter, 1969). In order to create the perception of legitimacy of the 
multiple choice test, the first question was solvable and included a correct solution as an option; 
however, this solvable question was not considered in the final analysis of this study. A 
negative marking rule had been enforced. Specifically, each student received 2 points for a 
response that was predetermined by the research team3 as the “correct” answer, and 1 point 
was to be subtracted for each response which was predetermined as an “incorrect” response. 
No points were to be gained or lost for each omitted response. 
Each point awarded to a participant equated to a reward of R1. Furthermore, participants were 
informed that a bonus of R50 would be given to each student who reached a score above 50 
points after completion of the test. As such, in this study, the threshold score of 50 points served 
as the reference point.  
Each participant was allocated to one of the four experimental groups. These groups received 
equal treatment, aside from the points assigned to the students in each group, as a preliminary 
“base” score. These points were assigned prior to the commencement of the multiple choice 
                                                          
3 African Micro-Economic Research Unit, University of the Witwatersrand 
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test, and were unique to each of the four treatment groups. The first and second groups were 
comprised of students who entered the experiment with 53 points (perceived as a gain) and 47 
points (perceived as a loss) respectively. Similarly, the third and fourth groups were comprised 
of students who entered the experiment with 35 points and 65 points respectively, in which the 
treatment group entering the experiment with 35 points represented a deviation further into the 
loss domain, and the group entering with 65 points represented a deviation further into the gain 
domain.  
 The range of achievable results for the multiple choice assessment spanned from a minimum 
25 points to maximum of 85 points. This encompasses the points that were either lost or gained 
during the test itself, in addition to the points that the students entered the experiment with as 
a function of their experimental group. The monetary payoff served as an incentive for students 
to participate in the experiment, as well as to induce relevant and appreciable consequences, 
since the payoff each student received was dependent upon their performance in the test. With 
the aforementioned R1 per point, and a bonus of R50 for reaching 50 points, the payoff limits 
ranged from a low of R25 to a high of R1354. 
A diagrammatic representation of a hypothetical valuation function in the context of the design 
of the experiment is presented in Figure 2 above. The horizontal axis denotes the number of 
                                                          
4 Calculated as the final result in Rand terms plus an additional R50 for all students who obtain 50 points or more 
as their final result. Therefore, the highest possible monetary payoff of R135 is achieved by students who receive 
R85 for a final score of 85 points, plus the additional R50 for obtaining a final score of 50 points or above. 
Figure 2: A Hypothetical Value Function in the Context of the 
Experiment 
Number of Points 
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points relative to the 50 point reference, and the vertical axis represents the value obtained by 
participants which we assume was derived from the monetary payout corresponding to their 
performance in the multiple choice test. In comparison to the standard S-shaped valuation 
function proposed by Kahneman & Tversky (1979), which is continuous through the reference 
point, the valuation function in the context of the experiment conducted in this study is 
discontinuous at the 50 point reference due to the inclusion of the premium that each student 
receives for crossing into, or remaining within the gain domain. 
Table 1 below documents the percentage of participants with particular observable 
characteristics after the assignment into each treatment group, inclusive of gender, measured 
by the percentage of female representation within each group, and the percentage of 
participants willing to accept a monthly wage of R500, which may thus be representative of 
financial need.  
Table 1: Percentage values of observable characteristic for each treatment group 
 
     
Variable Group 1 Group 2   Group 3 Group 4  
           
Gender 46.43 44  45.83 48 
      
Students Willing to      
Accept a Monthly        53.57 48  54.17 44 
Wage of R500      
           
      
The experimental sample consists of 102 participating students who were not allowed to self-
select themselves into a particular treatment group. The first two treatment groups in close 
proximity to the 50 point reference consist of 28 and 25 students respectively; and similarly, 
the third and fourth treatment groups at the extreme ends of the loss and gain domain were 
individually comprised of 24 and 25 participating students. 
The four treatment groups in which students enter the experiment with differential points are 
approximately balanced in term of the gender variable and the percentage of participants 
willing to accept a monthly wage of R500, taking into consideration the relatively small sample 
sizes within each treatment group. The balance of the observable characteristics in this study 
supports the proposition that the assignment of students to the four different treatment groups 
was completely random.  
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In accordance with the University’s ethical policy, participation in this study was absolutely 
voluntary and participation/non-participation did not affect the students’ academic 
performance in any credit bearing course. Furthermore, the identity of participants has 
remained completely anonymous in the final analysis of this study since the findings are 
reported in an aggregate format only. In addition, participating students were made aware of 
the full range of possible financial payoffs before their decision to participate. 
The use of a Randomized Control Trial (RCT) in this study as opposed to Items Response 
Theory (IRT)5 is due to the fact that the behavior of students with an average class mark (before 
they sit for the final examination) above or below 50% cannot necessarily be compared. Such 
a comparison necessitates that students above and below the 50% pass mark are not 
systematically different, especially with respect to their content knowledge. Thus, differences 
in a student’s behavior under a test-like situation, as captured by observational data from an 
actual examination, might be reflective of factors other than the position of the student in the 
gain or loss domain relative to the 50% pass mark threshold. 
The experimental nature of this study enables a causal link to be established between the 
treatment in terms of the initial amount of points received by each student and the tendency to 
guess. Firstly, this relationship can be attributed to the exclusion of content knowledge as a 
covariate – as participants cannot reduce the number of possible solution options through their 
partial knowledge or obtain the correct answer to the question, since none of the alternative 
solutions provided are correct; and secondly, due to the random allocation of participating 
students into the four treatment groups which ensures that no other observable and 
unobservable characteristics explicates differences in the test behaviour of students. We can 
therefore assume that none of the four treatment groups consist of participants with particular 
characteristics that would make them respond differently to the multiple choice test questions; 
for example, due to a higher innate level of risk aversion or increased content knowledge. Thus, 
the utilisation of the RCT design for the experiment in this study singularly tests the guessing 
behaviour of students who enter a test or an examination with different average scores (marks) 
relative to a reference point, and any differences in the answering behaviour of the students can 
therefore be attributed to the random allocation into one of these four treatment groups. 
                                                          
5 IRT provides a model based linkage between the latent characteristics of a test taker and the item responses 
assessed by a test i.e. it models the response of an examinee of a given ability to each item in a test or examination.  
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The expected points from guessing are computed using the equation 𝐸𝑃 =  
1
𝐶
𝐺 +  
𝐶−1
𝐶
𝐿, in 
which G and L represents the number of points gained for a correct response and the number 
of points lost for an incorrect response respectively; and C denotes the number of possible 
solution options. Since each question is comprised of 3 possible solution options and the 
student gains 2 points for a correct response, and loses 1 point for an incorrect response, the 
expected points from a random guess will be zero (EP = 0). Furthermore, when the expected 
score of a guess is zero, rational respondents should always guess, since guessing is at least as 
good as omitting a response (Bereby-Meyer, Meyer, & Flascher, 2002).  
4 Analysis and Discussion 
 
4.1 Treatment Effect 
The focus of the analysis is embedded in each participant’s decision to answer or omit a 
response for the nine unsolvable questions in the multiple choice test. A response to each 
unsolvable question is indicative of an individual’s tendency to guess under the negative 
marking regime, corresponding to the manner in which their choices are framed. The analysis 
proceeds with a comparison of the first and second treatment groups, which are comprised of 
students who enter the experiment with 53 and 47 points respectively. The average and median 
number of responses for the nine unsolvable questions; the percentage of students responding 
to all or none of the unsolvable items; as well as the percentage of participants willing to 
respond to a sufficient number of questions, thus enabling them to cross the 50 point threshold 
in either direction (from the loss domain into the gain domain or vice versa), are documented 
for the first two treatment groups in Table 2 below. 
An immediate observation is that 100% of participants entering the experiment with 47 points 
respond to two or more questions which facilitates crossing the 50 point threshold. A response 
to two or more questions are carried out by participants under the assumption that their answers 
are indeed correct. This in itself, is suggestive of the level of importance attached to traversing 
from the loss domain into the gain domain. However, 85.17% of participants in the treatment 
group entering the experiment with 53 points take a gamble of responding to four or more 
questions and risk falling below the 50 point threshold. The importance of crossing into the 
gain domain is therefore greater than the aversion or avoidance expressed by participants 
towards crossing into the loss domain. 
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Table 2: Treatment effects for the first two groups who are simply in the gain and loss 
domain 
Treatment 
Group 
Average 
Number  
Median 
Number 
Percentage 
of Students 
that 
Percentage 
of Students 
that 
Percentage of Students Willing 
to Respond to a Sufficient 
Number 
 
of 
Guesses 
of 
Guesses 
Respond to 
0 
Questions 
Respond to 
9 
Questions 
of Questions to Cross Over the 
50 Point Reference in either 
Direction 
Group 1: 
53 points 5.39 6 7.14 17.86 85.17 
      
Group 2: 
47 points  6.28 7 0 16 100 
            
      
Prospect theory alludes to the fact that a gain is valued more than an equal loss is disvalued in 
the loss domain, and a loss is disvalued more than an equal gain is valued in the gain domain. 
However, it provides no indication of what seems to occur with regard to crossing into either 
the gain or loss domain. The introduction of the R50 premium assigns greater value by 
participants towards receiving it, implying that greater importance is attached to traversing 
from the loss domain into the gain domain, in comparison to how much they disvalue losing it. 
These dynamics, however, could be altered through the introduction of a higher premium.  
The average number of guesses by participants in the gain domain (Group 1) is 5.39 in 
comparison to an average of 6.28 in the loss domain (Group 2), which advocates that 
participants in the gain domain display a lower tendency to guess than those in the loss domain. 
These results are commensurate with prospect theory in which individuals in the gain domain 
are more risk averse in comparison to those in the loss domain. 
An equivalent conclusion arises through an inspection of the median number of guesses which 
are less sensitive to outliers. Participants in the gain domain have a median of 6 guesses, 
therefore exhibiting increased risk averse behaviour in comparison to those in the loss domain, 
with a median of 7 guesses. An analysis of the percentage of students that respond to none of 
the questions accentuates that participants in the gain domain are risk averse with 7.14% of the 
28 participants in Group 1 choosing to respond to none of the questions presented to them. 
Participants in the loss domain are less risk averse in comparison to those in the gain domain, 
in which 100% respond to at least one question in the experimental assessment. The percentage 
of students that respond to all nine unsolvable items are relatively similar for the two treatment 
groups under consideration, therefore, no inference can be made regarding the difference in the 
degree of risk aversion expressed by these participants.  
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Groups 3 and 4 are comprised of students who enter the experiment with 35 and 65 points 
respectively. The average and median number of guesses; the percentage of students that 
respond to all or none of the nine unsolvable questions; and the percentage of students willing 
to respond to a sufficient number of questions to cross the 50 point reference, either from the 
loss domain into the gain domain or vice versa, are documented for the second two treatment 
groups in Table 3 below. 
Table 3: Treatment effects for the second two treatment groups with a deviation of points 
further into the loss and gain domain 
Participants in each of the two extreme treatment groups respond to at least one of the nine 
unsolvable items for a deviation of points further into the gain and loss domain. 54.17% of the 
24 participants in the group entering the experiment with 35 points, and 32% of the 25 
participants in the group entering the experiment with 65 points respond to all nine questions.  
Participants in the treatment group entering the experiment with 35 points need to correctly 
answer eight or more questions in comparison to two or more questions by participants entering 
the experiment with 47 points. 66.67% of participants in the treatment group entering the 
experiment at the extreme end of the loss domain i.e. those commencing the experiment with 
a preliminary score of 35 points, respond to eight questions or more, therefore, providing an 
indication of the level importance attached to crossing over the 50 point threshold into the gain 
domain.    
Notwithstanding the fact that participants entering the experiment with 65 points are already in 
the gain domain, they have an added advantage such that an incorrect response to all nine 
questions will not result in a fall below the 50 point reference. In this instance, no inference 
can be made, since 100% of participants not taking a gamble of crossing into the loss domain 
 
      
Treatment 
Group 
Average 
Number  
Median 
Number 
Percentage 
of Students 
that 
 Percentage 
of Students 
that 
Percentage of Students 
Willing to Respond to a 
Sufficient Number 
 
of 
Guesses 
of 
Guesses 
Respond to 
0 
Questions 
 
Respond to 
9 
Questions 
of Questions to Cross 
Over the 50 Point 
Reference in either 
Direction 
Group 3: 
35 points 7.42 9 0 
 
54.17 66.67 
       
Group 4: 
65 points  6.84 8 0 
 
32 100 
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will not have any implications on the outcome of interest, due to the impossibility of falling 
below the 50 point threshold. 
 In addition to the aforementioned results, the average and median number of guesses suggests 
that participants entering the experiment with 35 points are more risk seeking in comparison to 
those entering with 65 points. Both the average and median number of guesses are significantly 
higher for the group commencing with 65 points. 
Table 4: Treatment effects for the full sample 
Treatment 
Group 
Average 
Number  
Median 
Number 
Percentage 
of Students 
that 
Percentage 
of Students 
that 
Percentage of Students Willing 
to Respond to a Sufficient 
Number 
 
of 
Guesses 
of 
Guesses 
Respond to 
0 Questions 
Respond to 
9 
Questions 
of Questions to Cross Over the 
50 Point Reference in either 
Direction 
Group 1: 
53 points 5.39 6 7.14 17.86 85.71 
      
Group 2: 
47 points  6.28 7 0 16 100 
      
Group 3: 
35 points 7.42 9 0 54.17 66.67 
      
Group 4: 
65 points  6.84 8 0 32 100 
            
      
The findings for the full sample in Table 4 above, which is simply an amalgamation of Tables 
2 and 3, advocates that as the number of points a participant enters the experiment with 
increases in the gain domain, they exhibit an increase in the tendency to guess. This is indicative 
of decreasingly risk averse behaviour. An inference can therefore be made that higher 
performing students with a higher class mark on average, before commencing with an 
examination, exhibit an increased tendency to guess in comparison to their lower performing 
counterparts. This is in accordance with the standard S-shaped valuation curve proposed by 
prospect theory. Similarly, as the number of points a student enters the experiment with 
decreases in the loss domain, participants become more risk seeking or less risk averse. It may 
be beneficial for these participants to guess more and potentially receive a higher score from 
each correct response.  
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4.2 Effect of the treatment on participants who are willing to receive a 
monthly wage of R500 
In each of the four treatment groups, participants were asked whether or not they would be 
willing to accept a monthly wage of R500. This serves as a proxy for each individual’s income 
status or level of financial need, in which participants willing to accept the R500 monthly wage 
are considered to be students who are recipients of a lower monthly income. In addition, this 
question provides an indication of the level of importance attached to the reference point i.e. 
how much participants’ value being in the gain domain over being in the loss domain. Since 
the payoff in this study is in monetary terms, the financial need argument may be interpreted 
as the students’ response to the level of importance assigned to passing any credit bearing 
course (remaining above the 50% pass mark). Therefore, students who are required to pass a 
course in order to proceed to the next level will attach a higher value to the R50 premium and 
hence, to remaining in the gain domain. For example, students who are registered for an 
Economics course as a Major, assign greater importance towards passing the course in 
comparison to those registered for the course as an elective. Table 5 below documents the 
treatment effects for participants in financial need allocated to the four treatment groups 
respectively.  
The percentage of participants that respond to none of the nine unsolvable questions for the 
group commencing the experiment with 53 points, demonstrates that some of the students 
assign a higher value to the R50 premium and therefore, to remaining in the gain domain. 
Hence, these participants have no incentive to take a risk, and avoid guessing at all costs. 
For a deviation of points further into the gain domain, lower income participants exhibit an 
increase in risk averse behaviour. The number of guesses decreases from an average of 5.47 
for participants entering the experiment with 53 points to an average of 5.45 for participants 
entering the experiment with 65 points. However, despite the difference in the average number 
of guesses between the two treatment groups under consideration being infinitesimal, the 
median number of guesses decreases from 6 to 5, justifying the increase in risk averse 
behaviour. Furthermore, a mere 8% of lower income participants that enter the experiment with 
65 points respond to all nine questions, emphasising the increasingly risk averse behaviour 
demonstrated for a deviation of points further into the gain domain. These results are contrary 
to the findings of the full sample and the behaviour postulated by the hypothesised valuation 
function initiated by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). 
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Table 5: Treatment effects for participants who are willing to accept a monthly wage of 
R500 
Lower income participants exhibit an increase in risk seeking behaviour for a deviation of 
points further into the loss domain. This is in accordance to the findings revealed by the full 
sample of participating students, elucidated through an increase in the average and median 
number of guesses, and an increase in the percentage of participants who are willing to respond 
to all nine unsolvable items.  
4.3 Effect of the treatment on participants who are NOT willing to receive a 
monthly wage of R500 
The treatment effects for participants who are not willing to receive a monthly wage of R500 
are represented in Table 6 below. In this instance, the proxy for income status is indicative of 
a higher monthly income and potentially a lower value attached to receiving the R50 premium. 
Contrary to the findings revealed by lower income participants, all participating students not 
willing to accept a monthly wage of R500 – amongst those entering the experiment with 53 
points, respond to at least one or more questions. The 7.14% of participants responding to none 
of the questions in the first group under consideration, for the full sample, may therefore be 
wholly attributed to the behaviour of the recipients of a lower monthly income. Hence, for 
individuals in financial need who value the R50 premium to a large extent, greater importance 
is attached to remaining in the gain domain in comparison to those who are not in financial 
need. 
Treatment 
Group 
Average 
Number  
Median 
Number 
Percentage 
of Students 
that 
Percentage 
of Students 
that 
Percentage of Students Willing to 
Respond to a Sufficient Number 
  
of 
Guesses 
of 
Guesses 
Respond to 
0 Questions 
Respond to 
9 Questions 
of Questions to Cross Over the 
50 Point Reference in either 
Direction  
Group 1: 
53 points 5.47 6 13.33 10.71 86.67 
      
Group 2: 
47 points 5.5 5 0 8 100 
      
Group 3: 
35 points 7.54 9 0 29.17 69.2 
      
Group 4: 
65 points 5.45 5 0 8 100 
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Table 6: Treatment effects for participants who are not willing to accept a monthly wage of R500 
For a deviation of points further into the gain domain, recipients of a higher monthly income 
exhibit a decrease in risk averse behaviour. These findings are contrary to those exhibited by 
lower income participants; however, it resonates with the findings of the full sample and the 
standard S-shaped valuation function proposed by prospect theory. Furthermore, for a deviation 
of points further into the loss domain, higher income participants become increasingly risk 
seeking. These findings are concurrent with the higher tendency to guess displayed by both 
lower income, and the full sample of participating students.  
4.4 Gender specific treatment effects  
The stratification of each treatment group according to gender permits the analysis of the 
treatment effects along gender lines.  Table 7 below documents the average and median number 
of guesses among both males and females, as well as the percentage of gender representation 
in each treatment group, willing to respond to a sufficient number of questions in order to cross 
above or below the 50 point reference.   
The results reveal that in close proximity to the reference i.e. for participants entering the 
experiment with 53 and 47 points respectively, the difference between both the mean and 
median number of guesses for male and female participants are marginal and not statistically 
significant. As the number of points a student enters the experiment with increases in the gain 
domain, both males and females become decreasingly risk averse. Similarly, as the number of 
      
Treatment 
Group 
Average 
Number  
Median 
Number 
Percentage 
of Students 
that 
Percentage 
of Students 
that 
Percentage of Students Willing 
to Respond to a Sufficient 
Number 
  
of 
Guesses 
of 
Guesses 
Respond to 
0 
Questions 
Respond to 
9 
Questions 
of Questions to Cross Over the 
50 Point Reference in either 
Direction  
Group 1: 
53 points 5.31 5 0 15.38 100 
      
Group 2: 
47 points 7 7 0 15.38 100 
      
Group 3: 
35 points 7.27 9 0 54.55 63.64 
      
Group 4: 
65 points 7.93 8 0 42.86 100 
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points a student enters the experiment with decreases in the loss domain, both male and female 
participants exhibit an increase in risk seeking behavior. The average and median number of 
guesses for the treatment groups entering the experiment with 35 and 65 points respectively, 
are higher for males in comparison to females.  
It can therefore be deduced that gender specific treatment effects do not prevail in close 
proximity to the reference point; however, for a deviation of points further into the gain and 
loss domain, the gender differences in the treatment effects become more distinct. In particular, 
females display a greater degree of risk aversion in comparison to males for the treatment 
groups entering the experiment with 35 and 65 points respectively. 
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Treatment  
Average 
Number of  
Median Number 
of  
Percentage of Females Willing to 
Respond to  
Average 
Number of  
Median 
Number of  
Percentage of Males Willing to 
Respond to  
Group  Guesses  Guesses 
a Sufficient Number of Questions 
to Cross Guesses  Guesses 
a Sufficient Number of Questions 
to Cross 
 among Females  among Females 
 Above or Below the 50 Point 
Reference  among Males  among Males 
 Above or Below the 50 Point 
Reference  
Group 1:  
53 points 5.77 6 69.23 5.07 6 66.67 
       
Group 2: 
47 points 6.27 6 100 6.29 7 100 
       
Group 3:  
35 points 6.82 8 54.55 7.92 9 76.92 
       
Group 4:  
65 points 6.25 7.5 100 7.38 8 100 
              
       
Table 7: Gender specific treatment effects 
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4.5 Gender specific treatment effects for participants who are willing and 
not willing to receive a monthly wage of R500 
 
Table 8 above presents the percentage of both male and female participants who are willing to 
accept a monthly wage of R500 within each treatment group and both the average and the 
median number of guesses amongst them. For participating students who enter the experiment 
with 53 and 47 points respectively, the average number of guesses suggests that males display 
a lower tendency to guess in comparison to females and are therefore more risk averse. 
However, the median number of guesses for participants simply in the loss domain proposes 
that females are more risk averse in comparison to males. Thus, caution needs to be exerted 
when interpreting these results due to the smaller sample sizes within each treatment group.  
For a deviation of points further into the gain domain, lower income males exhibit decreasingly 
risk averse behaviour in comparison to the increasingly risk averse behaviour demonstrated by 
                                                          
6 The sample sizes on which the average and median number of guesses are being evaluated are getting smaller, 
therefore, caution needs to be exerted regarding the interpretation of these results.  
 
      
Treatment  
Percentage of 
Males  
Average 
Number 
of  
Median 
Number 
of 
Percentage of 
Females  
Average 
Number 
of  
Median 
Number 
of 
Group  
Willing to 
Accept a Guesses Guesses 
Willing to 
Accept a Guesses Guesses 
 
Monthly 
Wage of R500 
(%)6 
among 
Males 
among 
Males 
Monthly 
Wage of R500 
(%) 
among 
Females 
among 
Females 
Group 1: 
53 points 28.57 4.25 4 25 6.86 7 
       
Group 2: 
47 points 16 5 5.5 32 5.75 5 
       
Group 3: 
35 points 37.5 7.89 9 16.67 6.75 7.5 
       
Group 4: 
65 points 16 6 6.5 28 5.14 4 
              
       
Table 8: Gender specific treatment effects for participants willing to accept a monthly 
wage of R500 
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lower income females. A deviation of points further into the loss domain results in both male 
and female participants becoming increasingly risk seeking. At the two extreme frames in 
which participants enter the experiment with 35 and 65 points respectively, lower income 
females exhibit a greater degree of risk aversion in comparison to their male counterparts. 
The percentage of male and female participants who are not willing to accept a monthly wage 
of R500, and the average and median number of guesses among them is presented in Table 9 
below. In close proximity to the 50 point reference, it is evident that females exhibit a greater 
degree of risk aversion in comparison to males. For a deviation of points further into the gain 
domain, both males and females exhibit increasingly risk averse behaviour. However, a 
deviation of points further into the loss domain, results in male participants displaying 
increasingly risk seeking behaviour, and females, decreasingly risk seeking behaviour. For  
participants entering the experiment with 35 and 65 points respectively, females who are not 
willing to receive a monthly wage of R500 are more risk averse than their male counterparts; 
however, when the analysis is based on the median number of guesses, the reverse holds for 
the group that enters the experiment with 35 points. Yet again, caution needs to be exerted 
when interpreting these findings.  
Table 9: Gender specific treatment effects for participants who are not willing to receive a 
monthly wage of R500 
Treatment  
Percentage of 
Males  
Average 
Number of  
Median 
Number of 
Percentage of 
Females  
Average 
Number 
of  
Median 
Number 
of 
Group  
Not Willing to 
Accept a Guesses Guesses 
Not Willing to 
Accept a Guesses Guesses 
 
Monthly Wage 
of R500 (%) 
among 
Males 
among 
Males 
Monthly Wage 
of R500 (%) 
among 
Females 
among 
Females 
Group 1: 
53 points 25 6 6 21.43 4.5 3 
       
Group 2: 
47 points 40 6.8 7 12 7.67 9 
       
Group 3: 
35 points 16.67 8 8.5 29.17 6.86 9 
       
Group 4: 
65 points 36 8 9 20 7.8 8 
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5 Regression Analysis 
5.1 Methodology 
The objective of the regression analysis is to assess whether or not the assignment of 
participants into the four treatment groups produces a statistically discernable difference in the 
guessing behaviour of students, particularly; when the influence of other covariates are held 
constant. These covariates are held constant in order to control for possible imbalances in 
observable characteristics. Given that the experiment in this study makes use of a Randomized 
Control Trial, the analysis will be conducted using an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) approach. 
The average number of guesses for the nine unsolvable questions in the multiple choice 
assessment will serve as the dependent variable (Y) in one instance, and the median number of 
guesses in another. Explanatory variables are comprised of a dummy variable for the different 
treatment groups (T) which enter the experiment with differential points, and a vector (X) 
inclusive of characteristics such as gender and participants willingness to accept a monthly 
wage of R500. The treatment group that enters the experiment with 53 points will serve as the 
baseline group to which the remaining three groups will be compared, such that: 
                                                   𝑌 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇 + 𝛽2𝑋 +  𝜀                                                   (1) 
where  𝜀 represents the disturbance term. 
The regression represented in equation 1 correspondingly permits the analysis of possible 
treatment heterogeneities along the lines of gender and income status, through an evaluation of 
interaction effects, utilising dummy variables, such that: 
                                                           𝑌 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇 +  𝛽2𝑇 ∗ 𝐷 +  𝜀                                              (2) 
where T*D is the interactive term between the treatment and a dummy variable representing 
either gender or a participant’s willingness to accept a monthly wage of R500. 
5.2 Regression Results 
The regression analysis proceeds by adopting a simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) approach 
for the full sample of participating students. The empirical results for regression with the 
average number of guesses as the dependent variable are presented in column 1 of Table 10 
below, with the robust standard errors in parenthesis. For the group that enters the experiment 
with 53 points serving as the baseline for comparison purposes, it is evident that the treatment 
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groups entering the experiment with 47, 35 and 65 points respectively are willing to guess more 
on average than the group of participants simply in the gain domain. The effect of the treatment 
in which participants enter the experiment with 47 points on the number of guesses is 
insignificant, even at a 10% level. However, the effect of the groups that enter with 35 and 65 
points are significant at a 1% and 10% level respectively. Participants in Group 3 have an 
average of 2.02 more guesses in comparison to those in Group 1. Similarly, participants in 
Group 4 have an average of 1.37 more guesses than those in close proximity to the reference 
in the gain domain. The gender effects reveal that females display a lower tendency to guess in 
comparison to male participants; however, the effect is insignificant.  
 
Similarly, column 2 represents the quantile regression coefficients which estimates the change 
in the median number of guesses. The effects of the treatment groups that enter the experiment 
       
      OLS     OLS 
              
Variables   Number of   
Number 
of 
   Guesses   Guesses 
   (1)    (2) 
              
Treatment (Group 2):   0.880   1.000 
47 Points   (0.697)   (1.669) 
       
Treatment (Group3):   2.022***   3.000** 
35 Points   (0.708)   (1.458) 
       
Treatment (Group 4):   1.372*   2.000 
65 Points   (0.733)   (1.623) 
       
Gender   -0.312   
-6.90e-
18 
   (0.493)   (1.137) 
       
Constant   5.538***   6.000*** 
   (0.621)   (1.247) 
       
Observations (N)   102   102 
              
  
 
    
Table 10: Regression results 
*** Significance at 1% level **Significance at 5% level *Significance at 10% level 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis 
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with 47 and 65 points on the median number of guesses are insignificant; however, the effect 
of the third treatment group entering the experiment with 35 points is significant at a 5% level.  
Table 11 documents the mean regression results of the possible treatment heterogeneities 
evaluated in this study with the number of guesses per student serving as the dependent 
variable. Columns 1 and 2 represent the gender effects for participants who are willing and not 
willing to accept a monthly wage of R500 respectively. For participants who are willing to 
accept a monthly wage of R500, the effects of the treatment groups that enter the experiment 
with 47, 35 and 65 points results in a higher tendency to guess in comparison to the group that 
enters the experiment with 53 points, with the effects of the third group entering the experiment 
with 35 points being significant at a 5% level, and having 3.64 more guesses on average than 
the comparison group. Close inspection of the interaction effects with male participants in the 
first treatment group serving as the comparison, indicates that the gender effects for participants 
entering the experiment with 35 points, are significant at a 10% level, whereby females have 
an average of 3.75 guesses less than male participants. Similarly, the results for participants 
who are not willing to accept a monthly wage of R500 advocates that the average treatment 
effects for the two groups entering with 35 and 65 points have a 10% level of significance, and 
both these groups have an average of 2 more guesses compared to the group that enters the 
experiment in close proximity to the reference in the gain domain. The interaction effects 
however, are insignificant across the three treatment groups under consideration.  
The results of the income effects for female and male participants are presented in columns 3 
and 4 respectively. The average treatment effects for female participants entering the 
experiment with the perception of being in the loss domain are insignificant. However, the 
treatment effect for the participating group entering the experiment with 65 points is significant 
at a 5% level, and these participants have an average of 2.03 more guesses compared to those 
entering the experiment with 53 points. An evaluation of the interaction effects reveals that the 
income effect for female participants that enter the experiment with 65 points is significant at 
a 10% level, and that female participants who are willing to accept a monthly wage of R500 
within this treatment group have an average of 2.66 less guesses in comparison to participants 
who are not willing to accept a monthly remuneration of R500 for the group entering the 
experiment with 53 points.  
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  OLS   OLS   OLS   OLS 
        
Variables 
Number 
of   
Number 
of   
Number 
of   
Number 
of 
 Guesses  Guesses  Guesses  Guesses 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
                
Treatment (Group 2): 0.750  0.800  1.897  1.733* 
47 Points (1.772)  (0.980)  (1.382)  (0.947) 
        
Treatment (Group3): 3.639**  2.000*  1.088  2.933*** 
35 Points (1.503)  (1.104)  (1.299)  (1.071) 
        
Treatment (Group 4): 1.250  2.000*  2.031**  2.933*** 
65 Points (1.664)  (1.047)  (0.862)  (1.014) 
        
Gender 2.607*  -1.500     
 (1.405)  (1.551)     
        
Group 2 * Gender -1.857  2.367     
 (2.046)  (1.999)     
        
Group 3 * Gender -3.746  0.357     
 (1.991)  (2.008)     
        
Group 4 * Gender -2.964  1.300     
 (2.111)  (1.719)     
        
Group 2 * R500 Wage    -1.917  -1.800 
     (1.505)  (1.212) 
        
Group 3 * R500 Wage    -0.107  -0.111 
     (1.642)  (0.931) 
        
Group 4* R500 Wage     -2.657*  -2.500** 
     (1.316)  (1.115) 
        
Constant 4.250***  6.000***  5.769***  5.067*** 
 (1.344)  (0.880)  (0.719)  (0.847) 
        
Observations (N) 51  51  47  55 
                
        
Table 11:  Effects of possible treatment heterogeneities 
*** Significance at 1% level **Significance at 5%level *Significance at 10% level 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis 
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Similarly, the average treatment effects for male participants entering the experiment with 35 
and 65 points are significant at a 1% level, in which both the treatment groups have an average 
of 2.93 more guesses compared to the group that enters with 53 points. In addition, the average 
treatment effect for male participants entering the experiment with 47 points is significant at a 
10% level, with an average of 1.73 more guesses than the comparison group. The interactive 
term demonstrates that the income effect for male participants entering the experiment with 65 
points is significant at a 5% level, with a decrease in the average number of guesses for 
participants willing to accept a monthly wage of R500.  
6 Conclusion 
Behavioural decision analyses provides a valuable contribution towards the understanding of 
educational assessments by taking into consideration the decisions faced by students during a 
test or an examination. The experimental nature of this study replicates an actual test situation 
whereby students enter a multiple choice test with a certain aggregate based upon their average 
class marks, and permits the analysis of the framing effect on a student’s tendency to guess 
under the adoption of a negative marking rule. This study eschews the mainstream approach of 
expected utility theory in the analysis of decision making under risk, and advocates that the 
framing effect of the scoring rule as a potential gain or loss relative to a reference point can be 
elucidated using prospect theory. In addition to evaluating whether the behaviour of students 
under such circumstances are consistent with the behaviour predicted by prospect theory, this 
study investigates whether the distance into the gain and loss domain yields significantly 
different results, and enables a causal relationship to be established between the different 
treatment groups and the tendency to guess. 
Overall, the results for the full sample under consideration; for individuals who are willing and 
not willing to accept a monthly wage of R500; the results across both genders; as well as the 
findings of the gender specific treatment effects for the recipients of a lower monthly income, 
advocates that the lowest degree of risk aversion or the greatest degree of risk seeking occurs 
for participants entering the experiment with 35 points i.e. for students with the lowest 
aggregate marks before commencing with an examination. These results are in accordance with 
prospect theory from the perspective of being in the loss domain; however, they are in conflict 
with prospect theory from the viewpoint that the greatest degree of risk seeking occurs at the 
extreme end of the loss domain. 
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A deviation of points further into the gain domain generally results in decreasingly risk averse 
behaviour, with the exception of lower income participants who are willing to accept a monthly 
wage of R500 exhibiting an increase in risk aversion. Therefore, while higher income 
individuals become less risk averse in the gain domain, those in financial need become 
increasingly risk averse with a deviation of points further into the gain domain. This increase 
in risk aversion is particularly demonstrated by female participants when analysing the gender 
effects of these lower income participants. A potential limitation, especially for the gender 
specific effects of participants who are willing and not willing to receive a monthly wage of 
R500, is that the sample sizes are extremely small which could result in a small sample bias; 
therefore, caution needs to be exerted when interpreting these results. Perhaps a larger sample 
size for the subgroups under consideration in this study will give rise to varying results. 
Lastly, the stratification of each treatment group according to gender permits the analysis of 
how the tendency to guess for both males and females, is affected by the way in which the 
scoring rule is framed. For the two treatment groups entering the experiment with 35 and 65 
points respectively, the results reveal that female participants exhibit a greater degree of risk 
aversion in comparison to males.  
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A Supplementary Appendix 
Test Questionnaire: 
 
Student number:                 ____________________ 
Gender:                               ____________________ 
As a student, would you be willing to accept a job that pays a monthly wage of R500? 
Yes ________  No ________ 
 
Multiple Choice Questions: 
1. A group of modern economists who believe that markets clear very rapidly and that 
expanding the money supply will always increase prices rather than employment are the: 
A. Monetarists 
B. New Classical School 
C. Keynesians 
 
2. What is the next term in the following sequence? 
1, 1, 2, 3, 19, 34, 83, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
A. 162 
B. 115 
C. 247 
 
3. The Independent Labour and Employment Equity Action Plan was drafted by Mbazima 
Sithole in which year? 
A. 1996 
B. 1994 
C. 1999 
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4. Who is the author of the book titled: “Random Walks and Business Cycles for Dummies”? 
A. Norman Gladwell 
B. Milton Savage 
C. John Friedman  
 
5. The Law of Diminishing Demand states that: 
A. As more of a particular good is demanded by the economy, less of that good is 
demanded by an individual. 
B. If good A is preferred to good B, then a higher demand for good B implies a lower 
demand for good A. 
C. As more of a good is supplied in an economy, the less of that good is demanded by the 
economy.  
 
6. The Depression of 1978 occurred as a result of: 
A. Severe drought affecting subsistence agriculture and herding. 
B. A banking panic which came about as a result of depositors simultaneously losing 
confidence in the solvency of the banks and demanding that their deposits be paid to 
them in cash.  
C. A decline in the population growth rate. 
 
7. A Pareto Supremum refers to the allocation of resources in which: 
A. All resources are directed to a single individual and no one can be made better off. 
B. It is possible to make all individuals better off. 
C. A socially desirable distribution is acquired through all individuals having a higher 
income. 
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8. The principle of Malthusian Dominance states that: 
A. Gains in income per person through technological advances dominates subsequent 
population growth. 
B. An increase in the market price caused by an increase in demand dominates the higher 
price caused by a deficiency in supply. 
C. Increased demand for subsistence consumption eliminates the non-productive elements 
of the economy.  
 
9. The Population Poverty Index estimates: 
A. The percentage of the population living in poor regions. 
B. The number of people earning below $1 a day. 
C. The average worldwide population living below the poverty line.  
 
10. A Walrasian Balanced Growth Path refers to: 
A. The act in which excess market supply counteracts excess market demand. 
B. A situation in which output per worker, capital per worker and consumption per worker 
are growing at a constant rate. 
C. An efficient allocation of goods and services in an economy, driven by seemingly 
separate decisions of individuals.  
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Solutions: 
1. B 
2. C 
3. C 
4. A 
5. B 
6. A 
7. C 
8. A 
9. B 
10. C 
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Group 1                                                                                                                                                            12 August 2014 
Good Day 
          
Welcome to this decision making experiment. My name is Jesal Kika and I am currently an Economic Science 
Masters student at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. Before proceeding to the test 
questionnaire, please take note of the experimental instructions below. At the beginning of the test, you already 
have 53 points to start off with and you are now being placed in a test situation in which you may gain or lose 
points in addition to the 53 points. These additional points may be gained or lost through a multiple choice test 
with the following rules:  
 You are required to answer a multiple choice test consisting of 10 questions in total. 
 You will receive 2 points for each correct response; lose 1 point for each incorrect response; and no 
points will be gained or lost for each question that you choose to omit. 
 Your final amount of points will be calculated as 53 plus the number of points you obtain in the test. 
 The payoff you receive will be on a rand (R1) per point basis i.e. you will receive R1 for each of your 
final amount of points. In addition, you will receive a bonus of R50 if your final score is above 50 points 
on completion of the test. 
 For example: If you receive 8 points for the test, your final amount of points will be 61 (53+8). In this 
instance, you will receive R61 + R50 bonus since your final score is above 50 points. Therefore, your 
final payout will be R111. 
 If however, you receive -6 points (lose 6 points) for example, your final amount of points will be 47 (53-
6). In this instance, you will receive a payout of R47 (you will NOT receive a bonus of R50 because your 
final score is below 50 points).  
 Note that your total payoff can vary between R43 and R123. 
 You have 20 minutes to complete the test. 
Please note that your participation in this experiment is completely voluntary, involves no risk and will not affect 
your academic results in any way. Your answers to these questions are completely confidential and your identity 
will remain anonymous in the analysis of this study. If you have any questions regarding the instructions above, 
please feel free to ask. Should you wish to withdraw from this experiment, you may do so at any stage. Thank 
you for your consideration to participate in this experiment. Should you wish to enquire about my study or 
access my final results, please feel free to contact me at jesalk@hotmail.com. You may now proceed to the test 
questionnaire.  
 
 
Kind regards 
Jesal C Kika 
Masters Student (Economic Science) 
School of Economic and Business Sciences 
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg 
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Group 2                                                                                                                                                            12 August 2014 
Good Day 
          
Welcome to this decision making experiment. My name is Jesal Kika and I am currently an Economic Science 
Masters student at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. Before proceeding to the test 
questionnaire, please take note of the experimental instructions below. At the beginning of the test, you already 
have 47 points to start off with and you are now being placed in a test situation in which you may gain or lose 
points in addition to the 47 points. These additional points may be gained or lost through a multiple choice test 
with the following rules:  
 You are required to answer a multiple choice test consisting of 10 questions in total. 
 You will receive 2 points for each correct response; lose 1 point for each incorrect response; and no 
points will be gained or lost for each question that you choose to omit. 
 Your final amount of points will be calculated as 47 plus the number of points you obtain in the test. 
 The payoff you receive will be on a rand (R1) per point basis i.e. you will receive R1 for each of your 
final amount of points. In addition, you will receive a bonus of R50 if your final score is above 50 points 
on completion of the test. 
 For example: If you receive 8 points for the test, your final amount of points will be 55 (47+8). In this 
instance, you will receive R55 + R50 bonus since your final score is above 50 points. Therefore, your 
final payout will be R105. 
 If however, you receive -6 points (lose 6 points) for example, your final amount of points will be 41 (47-
6). In this instance, you will receive a payout of R41 (you will NOT receive a bonus of R50 because your 
final score is below 50 points).  
 Note that your total payoff can vary between R37 and R117. 
 You have 20 minutes to complete the test. 
Please note that your participation in this experiment is completely voluntary, involves no risk and will not affect 
your academic results in any way. Your answers to these questions are completely confidential and your identity 
will remain anonymous in the analysis of this study. If you have any questions regarding the instructions above, 
please feel free to ask. Should you wish to withdraw from this experiment, you may do so at any stage. Thank 
you for your consideration to participate in this experiment. Should you wish to enquire about my study or 
access my final results, please feel free to contact me at jesalk@hotmail.com. You may now proceed to the test 
questionnaire.  
 
 
Kind regards 
Jesal C Kika 
Masters Student (Economic Science) 
School of Economic and Business Sciences 
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg 
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Group 3                                                                                                                                                           
Good Day                                                                                                                                                          12 August 2014 
          
Welcome to this decision making experiment. My name is Jesal Kika and I am currently an Economic Science 
Masters student at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. Before proceeding to the test 
questionnaire, please take note of the experimental instructions below. At the beginning of the test, you already 
have 35 points to start off with and you are now being placed in a test situation in which you may gain or lose 
points in addition to the 35 points. These additional points may be gained or lost through a multiple choice test 
with the following rules:  
 You are required to answer a multiple choice test consisting of 10 questions in total. 
 You will receive 2 points for each correct response; lose 1 point for each incorrect response; and no 
points will be gained or lost for each question that you choose to omit. 
 Your final amount of points will be calculated as 35 plus the number of points you obtain in the test. 
 The payoff you receive will be on a rand (R1) per point basis i.e. you will receive R1 for each of your 
final amount of points. In addition, you will receive a bonus of R50 if your final score is above 50 points 
on completion of the test. 
 For example: If you receive 18 points for the test, your final amount of points will be 53 (35+18). In this 
instance, you will receive R53 + R50 bonus since your final score is above 50 points. Therefore, your 
final payout will be R103. 
 If however, you receive -5 points (lose 5 points) for example, your final amount of points will be 30 (35-
5). In this instance, you will receive a payout of R30 (you will NOT receive a bonus of R50 because your 
final score is below 50 points).  
 Note that your total payoff can vary between R25 and R105. 
 You have 20 minutes to complete the test. 
Please note that your participation in this experiment is completely voluntary, involves no risk and will not affect 
your academic results in any way. Your answers to these questions are completely confidential and your identity 
will remain anonymous in the analysis of this study. If you have any questions regarding the instructions above, 
please feel free to ask. Should you wish to withdraw from this experiment, you may do so at any stage. Thank 
you for your consideration to participate in this experiment. Should you wish to enquire about my study or 
access my final results, please feel free to contact me at jesalk@hotmail.com. You may now proceed to the test 
questionnaire.  
 
 
Kind regards 
Jesal C Kika 
Masters Student (Economic Science) 
School of Economic and Business Sciences 
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg 
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Group 4  
Good Day                                                                                                                                                          12 August 2014 
          
Welcome to this decision making experiment. My name is Jesal Kika and I am currently an Economic Science 
Masters student at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. Before proceeding to the test 
questionnaire, please take note of the experimental instructions below. At the beginning of the test, you already 
have 65 points to start off with and you are now being placed in a test situation in which you may gain or lose 
points in addition to the 65 points. These additional points may be gained or lost through a multiple choice test 
with the following rules:  
 You are required to answer a multiple choice test consisting of 10 questions in total. 
 You will receive 2 points for each correct response; lose 1 point for each incorrect response; and no 
points will be gained or lost for each question that you choose to omit. 
 Your final amount of points will be calculated as 65 plus the number of points you obtain in the test. 
 The payoff you receive will be on a rand (R1) per point basis i.e. you will receive R1 for each of your 
final amount of points. In addition, you will receive R50 for participating in this test. 
 For example: If you receive 10 points for the test, your final amount of points will be 75 (65+10). 
Therefore, your final payout will be R125 (R75 + R50). 
 If however, you receive -10 points (lose 10 points) for example, your final amount of points will be 55 
(65-10). In this instance, you will receive a payout of R105 (R55 + R50).  
 Note that your total payoff can vary between R105 and R145. 
 You have 20 minutes to complete the test. 
Please note that your participation in this experiment is completely voluntary, involves no risk and will not affect 
your academic results in any way. Your answers to these questions are completely confidential and your identity 
will remain anonymous in the analysis of this study. If you have any questions regarding the instructions above, 
please feel free to ask. Should you wish to withdraw from this experiment, you may do so at any stage. Thank 
you for your consideration to participate in this experiment. Should you wish to enquire about my study or 
access my final results, please feel free to contact me at jesalk@hotmail.com. You may now proceed to the test 
questionnaire.  
 
 
Kind regards 
Jesal C Kika 
Masters Student (Economic Science) 
School of Economic and Business Sciences 
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg 
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